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Excess varianceWe estimate social externalities of tax evasion in a model where congestion of the auditing resources of local
tax authorities generates a social multiplier. Identiﬁcation is based on a contrast of the variance of tax evasion
at different levels of aggregation. We use a unique data set that contains audits of about 80,000 small
businesses and professionals in Italy and also provides an exact measure of reference groups in our model.
We ﬁnd a social multiplier of about 3, which means that the equilibrium response to a shock that induces
an exogenous variation in mean concealed income is about 3 times the initial average response. This is a
short-run effect that persists to the extent that auditing resources are not adjusted to internalize the conges-
tion externality.Theft—whether from the state, from a fellow citizen or from a
looted Jewish store—was so widespread that in the eyes of many
people it ceased to be a crime.
—Tony Judt, Postwar.1
1. Introduction
In this paper, we investigate the social determinants of tax compli-
ance and tax evasion. Like most other kinds of illegal behavior, tax
evasion exhibits large variance across geographic units with relatively
similar fundamentals, such as similar countries or areas within a
country.2 In the benchmark model of Allingham and Sandmo (1972)lio.zanella@unibo.it (G. Zanella).
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of Vibo Valentia.such fundamentals are the parameters characterizing preferences
(degree of risk aversion), the tax system (tax rates) and the enforce-
ment system (probability of detection and sanctions).3 In this paper
we use detailed audit data from Italy to show that the observed
large variance of tax evasion in spite of similar fundamentals reﬂects,
to some extent, social externalities in underreporting income. We
emphasize a particular source of such externalities: tax enforcement
congestion.
Generally speaking, although large residual variance in illegal be-
havior—and many other types of socioeconomic phenomena—may
be due to mere unobserved heterogeneity, social scientists view
such variance increasingly as a telltale sign of interdependencies be-
tween individual decision makers. Glaeser et al. (1996) pioneered
this approach by showing formally how positive covariance between
individual decisions to engage in crime generates a multiplier effect
that ampliﬁes—both in time and across space—relatively small differ-
ences in fundamentals. The reason is that, in the presence of positive3 An extension of this model allows for “tax morale”, an intrinsic motivation induc-
ing people to abide by their tax obligations—i.e., an additional preference parameter.
See, for example, the theoretical analysis of Gordon (1989) and the empirical study
by Frey and Feld (2002). Andreoni et al. (1998) and Slemrod (2007) offer excellent sur-
veys of theory and evidence on tax compliance and tax evasion. Sandmo (2005) offers
a retrospective discussion of the shortcomings and of the unexploited potential of the
Allingham-Sandmo model.
5 In assuming that the ﬁne is proportional to the evaded tax (and not to undeclared in-complementarities between individual choices, any shock affects in-
dividual behavior directly via private incentives and indirectly via
the behavior of other individuals. The ratio between the equilibrium
aggregate response to the shock and the sum of the direct, initial in-
dividual responses is the social multiplier.4 For the most, the literature
interprets these externalities as having been generated by sociologi-
cal forces embedded in individual preferences—what Manski (2000)
classiﬁes as “preference” interactions. For example, the seminal
paper of Allingham and Sandmo (1972) includes an extended version
of the basic model that features a social stigma effect; Gordon (1989)
introduces the idea of tax morale sustained by peer pressure in a model
of tax evasion; Cowell (1990, chapter 6) analyzes equilibrium tax eva-
sion when preferences depend on the average evasion of other tax-
payers; and Myles and Naylor (1996) analyze an optimal audit policy
for an independent revenue service when there is a social custom that
rewards honest taxpaying. In this paperwe emphasize a potentially im-
portant source of social complementarity that is more technological in
nature and thus more amenable to policy: enforcement congestion.
The idea is that the probability of apprehension and punishment
decreases if more people behave illegally while the enforcer's available
resources are ﬁxed. Manski (2000) classiﬁes these as “constraint” inter-
actions. The importance of constraint interactions for illegal behavior is
discussed by Ehrlich (1973), Sah (1991), and, more recently, Ferrer
(2010). In the context of tax evasion, this externality is implicit in
models where taxpayers and the tax authority interact strategically
and the latter is subject to a budget constraint in its auditing activity
(Sanchez and Sobel, 1993; Bassetto and Phelan, 2008).
We allow for tax enforcement congestion in a simple model where
taxpayers belong to local tax jurisdictions and decide how much to
report to a local tax authority, which performs audits subject to a
budget constraint. If the individual probability of an audit is decreas-
ing in individual reported income and the local budget constraint
cannot be relaxed promptly, then a social effect arises: when some
taxpayers report less income, the probability of other taxpayers in
that jurisdiction being audited decreases. Hence these other taxpayers
will also report less income. In the social interactions literature, the
group that inﬂuences the behavior of an individual is called that indi-
vidual's reference group. Therefore, local tax jurisdictions are natural
reference groups in the tax evasionmodel we describe here. The equi-
librium maps into the popular linear-in-means model frequently
employed in empirical analyses of social interactions (Manski, 1993).
Thus our estimates admit a structural interpretation.
Identiﬁcation exploits the “variance contrasts” method developed
by Graham (2008), who extends the framework of Glaeser et al.
(1996). The key idea is that the social multiplier can be identiﬁed by
comparing the within-group and between-group variance of individ-
ual behavior (i.e., the same variance at different levels of aggregation)
provided at least one group-level exogenous characteristic affects the
within-group variance but does not directly affect the between-group
variance. As in Graham (2008), the typically larger dispersion of indi-
vidual heterogeneity (and so of tax evasion) in small reference groups
provides such an identifying restriction. We show that the social mul-
tiplier can be identiﬁed in this way while retaining a structural inter-
pretation in terms of only endogenous social effects.
Our empirical analysis employs a unique, cross-sectional data set
of tax audits of self-employed workers in Italy (i.e., of small busi-
nesses and professionals). The audits we observe were performed
by local branches of the national ﬁscal authority. These branches are
responsible for tax enforcement within local tax jurisdictions. We
thus observe the exact measure of reference groups in our model—a
unique feature among nonexperimental studies of social interactions.
We ﬁnd a social multiplier of about 3, which means that the4 We believe the term social multiplier was ﬁrst used in the sense in which it is now
commonly used in the social interactions literature by Schlicht (1981).equilibrium aggregate response to a shock that affects concealed in-
come is about 3 times the initial average response. This result has
noteworthy policy implications. We mention two of them here, post-
poning a thorough discussion until the end of the paper. First, reduc-
ing tax evasion may be easier than generally supposed, because the
social multiplier ampliﬁes the impact of stricter enforcement. In
other words, governments can reduce tax evasion at a fraction of
the cost needed to directly induce each taxpayer to report more hon-
estly. Conversely, looser enforcement reduces tax revenues more
than when multiplier effects are absent. Second, if individual incen-
tives change in favor of underreporting then the government should
promptly adjust its auditing resources in order to internalize the con-
gestion externality and prevent an outbreak of tax evasion.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model,
and Section 3 describes the data set and its institutional background.
The formal econometric framework is presented in Section 4 along
with the identiﬁcation strategy. Results are reported in Section 5,
and Section 6 concludes. A Supplemental web appendix (Galbiati
and Zanella, 2012) contains all derivations, some extensions, and ad-
ditional material.
2. Model
2.1. Setup and equilibrium
Our empirical analysis will exploit data on income reports by self-
employed workers. Because the personal income of these workers is
not subject to third-party report, the Allingham–Sandmo model is
particularly apt for interpreting these data. Consider a population of
N taxpayers, indexed by i=1, …, N, distributed across G tax jurisdic-
tions, indexed by g=1, …, G and of size ng. Local tax authorities are
in charge of tax enforcement in each group g, and they receive from
the central government ag≤ng tokens that can be used to audit tax-
payers. The cost of an audit is one token. The taxable income of taxpay-
er i is private information and is denoted yi. The taxpayer reports an
amount yiR, which is public information, to the local tax authority
and pays a tax at an exogenous, individual-speciﬁc ﬂat rate ti on this
amount. Taxpayer i in jurisdiction g is audited with probability pig.
We assume that an audit enables the tax authority to observe true tax-
able income. If yiR=yi then nothing happens, but if yiRbyi then the tax-
payermust pay the full tax bill as well as a proportional ﬁne at rate f on
the evaded tax.5We assume that there are no rebates when a taxpayer
over reports income (i.e., when yiR>yi). Hence the taxpayer will never
over report and so we can ignore that case in what follows.
We assume that the taxpayer is risk neutral.6 Therefore, we follow
Scotchmer (1987) in assuming that the goal of the taxpayer is to
minimize the expected tax bill:
min
yRi
1−pig
 
tiy
R
i þ pigti yi þ f yi−yRi
  
: ð1Þ
We do not model explicitly the determination of audit probabili-
ties. Rather, we posit a linear speciﬁcation that captures in a simple
way the externality arising from the tax authority budget constraint
when auditing resources are given:
pig ¼
ag
ng
þ α0Pr yRi byijxi
 
− α1
ng−1
Xng
j¼1; j≠i
Pr yRj byjjxj
 
: ð2Þcome) we adopt the Yitzhaki (1974) variant of the Allingham-Sandmo model, although
which version is adopted is not important for our purposes. The Yitzhaki variant simpliﬁes
the model because it rules out the substitution effect when the tax rate changes.
6 This assumption is appealing in the context of this paper because our data set con-
sists of a sample of entrepreneurs.
Here α0 and α1 are positive parameters, and x is a vector of indi-
vidual characteristics observable to the tax authority. It is understood,
as in any linear probability model, that pig is deﬁned to be 1 (resp., 0)
if the right-hand side of (2) exceeds unity (resp., is negative). The ﬁrst
term on the RHS of (2) is the baseline probability of an audit: if the
tax authority audited taxpayers at random, then ag/ng is the probabil-
ity that any taxpayer in group g is audited. The second term reﬂects
the idea that, the higher the probability (as estimated by the tax au-
thority on the basis of x) of taxpayer i concealing income, the higher
the likelihood of an audit. The last term reﬂects this same idea for the
other taxpayers in the jurisdiction and thus represents a local exter-
nality: if the other taxpayers in the group become more likely
cheaters in the eyes of the tax authority and if the number of individ-
uals that can be audited (i.e., ag) is given, then those other taxpayers
will force the local authority to shift auditing resources away from
taxpayer i. In other words, when the resource constraint of the local
auditor is binding and taxpayer i conceals more income it becomes
less likely that other taxpayers in the jurisdiction will be audited.
We assume that the congestion effect is uniform, whence the magni-
tude of the externality is normalized by group size after removing
individual i (i.e., ng−1).
Eq. (2) collapses the dynamic process described by Sah (1991)
into a static setting. Sah describes a dynamic model in which potential
criminals update the perceived probability of detection after observ-
ing how many people in their social neighborhood engage in crime
and howmany are apprehended. In Sah's model, the actual apprehen-
sion rate decreases with the number engaging in crime because re-
sources cannot adjust immediately. This lower apprehension rate
feeds back into the perceived probability of apprehension, which de-
creases as a consequence. Therefore, our static formulation is consis-
tent with the cross-sectional implications of dynamic models of
enforcement congestion.
We impose further linearities on our framework by assuming that
the two probabilities on the RHS of Eq. (2) are themselves governed
by a linear probability model. That is: for every individual i and for pa-
rameters β0>0 and β1,
Pr yRi byijxi
 
¼ 1−Pr yi≤yRi jxi
 
¼ 1−β0yRi−β1xi; ð3Þ
where we retain our previous understanding of this function's behav-
ior. The linearities introduced by Eqs. (2) and (3) are somewhat ad
hoc, but they offer the important advantage of allowing us to derive
clearly the linear-in-means model of social interactions from a micro-
founded model of taxpayer behavior. This derivation is illustrated
next.
At an interior optimum, the ﬁrst-order necessary conditions for a
minimum7 in the taxpayer's problem exactly balance the expected
marginal beneﬁt and cost of underreporting income, net of the mar-
ginal effect on the probability of an audit.8 That is:
ti 1−pig
 
¼ tipigf−
∂pig
∂yRi
ti 1þ fð Þ yi−yRi
 
: ð4Þ7 The second-order condition is satisﬁed as long as ∂ pig/∂ yiR≤0—that is, if α0β0>0,
which we have assumed to hold.
8 Corner solutions are possible if the LHS of Eq. (4) is either strictly greater or strictly
less than the RHS. In the ﬁrst case the taxpayer conceals all of his taxable income; in the
second he conceals none. Although such corner solutions are observed in our data
(they constitute, respectively, 6.6% and 25.8% of the sample), they are not a source of
concern for our empirical analysis. The reason is that such analysis will use jurisdic-
tions as units of observation and all jurisdictions are, empirically, at an interior
equilibrium.Under the large group approximation
ng−1
 −1 Xng
j¼1;j≠i
yRj ≃n
−1
g
Xng
i¼1
yRi ¼ E yRi
g
 
; ð5Þ
if we substitute expression (2) into the taxpayer's ﬁrst-order condi-
tion (4) then the latter boils down to the linear-in-means behavioral
equation of Manski (1993):
eig ¼ δ0 þ δ1Xi þ δ2 Xg þ δ3
ag
ng
þ Jeg; ð6Þ
here eig≡yi−yiR is concealed taxable income, ēg is the corresponding
average (in a rational expectations sense) in jurisdiction g,
Xi≡ yi; xið Þ, and Xg≡ yg ; xg
 
. The terms yg and xg denote the
jurisdiction-level averages (in a rational expectations sense) of yi
and xi, respectively.
9 Eq. (6) is a reaction function, and J is the main
parameter of interest because it measures externalities across tax-
payers. In Manski's (1993) terminology, J captures endogenous social
effects because ēg is endogenously determined in the model. All of the
parameters in Eq. (6) have a structural interpretation. In particular, as
shown in the Supplemental web appendix (Galbiati and Zanella,
2012), the endogenous interactions parameter has the following
expression:
J≡ α1
2α0
: ð7Þ
The interpretation is straightforward. Recall that α0 is the param-
eter determining the extent to which taxpayer i reporting less (more)
income drives auditing resources toward (away from) i and that α1 is
the parameter determining the extent to which other taxpayers
reporting less (more) income drive auditing resources away from (to-
ward) i. Eq. (7) expresses the net effect of these two forces on equilib-
rium behavior. The more sensitive the probability of an audit is to
how much other taxpayers in the jurisdiction are reporting, the
more a taxpayer reacts to others’ behavior. This is the positive depen-
dence of J on α1. However, such a reaction inﬂuences the probability
of an audit in the opposite direction, and this affects the expected
tax bill in two ways: by altering the expected tax payment on the
marginal unit of reported or concealed income and by altering the
expected tax payment on all the inframarginal units. The model is lin-
ear, so the marginal and the average effect are the same. This explains
the negative dependence of J on α0 multiplied by 2.
The structural interpretation of J, as expressed by Eq. (7) is of
course model speciﬁc, since the only social effect we are modeling is
the congestion externality. We have good reasons for this choice, as
detailed in Section 2.2. If we allowed for additional social effects,
such as an endogenous social norm, then J would also reﬂect prefer-
ence parameters. This case is brieﬂy illustrated in the Supplemental
web appendix (Galbiati and Zanella, 2012): when the group that de-
ﬁnes the social norm coincides with the tax jurisdiction, then one can
derive the analogue of Eq. (7) for the extended model in closed form
and conclude that the parameter we identify is an upper bound of the
contribution of the congestion externality. In all the other cases, the
interpretation is more complicated.
Notice that the linear-in-means model, Eq. (6), requires Jb1. This
is a stability requirement: if J≥1 then aggregate concealed income
would diverge following even a tiny shock. The requirement imposes
a restriction on our structural parameters—namely, that α1b2α0. In
other words, the congestion externality generated by others’ behavior
on the probability of an audit, α1, needs to be sufﬁciently weak rela-
tive to the own effect, α0. Observe also that J=0 if and only if9 The derivation is reported in the Supplemental web appendix (Galbiati and
Zanella, 2012).
10 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for emphasizing this point, which is fur-
ther illustrated in the Supplemental web appendix (Galbiati and Zanella, 2012).
11 Our interpretation, based on what we know of the socioeconomic environment in
Italy, is that the activities of self-employed workers tend to have deep local roots in
that country. For this reason the Italian self-employed face above-average mobility
costs.α1=0. That is, if there is no congestion externality then there are no
multiplier effects in this model. In that case all social effects, both en-
dogenous (J) and exogenous (δ2), are absent; in the Supplemental
web appendix (Galbiati and Zanella, 2012) we show that if J=0
then δ2=0 as well.
The last step in solving the model is to compute explicitly average
concealed income in jurisdiction g. Averaging eig within a jurisdiction
and solving for ēg yields
eg ¼ γδ0 þ γ δ1 þ δ2ð ÞXg þ γδ3
ag
ng
; ð8Þ
where γ≡ 1−Jð Þ−1. The model has a unique Nash equilibrium that is
characterized by an individual level of concealed income, a reduced
form obtained by substituting Eq. (8) into Eq. (6), as follows:
eig ¼ γδ0 þ δ1Xi þ γ−1ð Þδ1 þ γδ2ð ÞXg þ γδ3
ag
ng
: ð9Þ
Parameter γ is the social multiplier—that is the ratio between the
average cumulative response and the initial individual response fol-
lowing an exogenous shock. If J>0 then γ>1 and there are multiplier
effects associated with changes in group characteristics or enforce-
ment resources.
2.2. Discussion
There are several important aspects of the model that, because
they bear on the interpretation of our empirical ﬁndings, merit the
more sustained attention provided in this section.
The most important such aspect is that, although we emphasize
congestion externalities, other social forces may be at work. First,
tax cheating is an activity that requires the development of particular
skills: people may learn via social interactions how to conceal their
income, or they may ﬁnd fraudulent accountants more easily in
places where tax evasion is widespread (Cowell, 1990), chapter 6.
Second, cheating on taxes may violate social norms whose strength
decreases with the extent of tax evasion itself (Myles and Naylor,
1996). Third, business informality can be transmitted across the pro-
duction chain if value-added taxes apply (de Paula and Scheinkman,
2010). Because we do not model these additional mechanisms in
the main analysis, one should bear in mind that the structural inter-
pretation of our estimates is model speciﬁc (as is often the case in
structural estimation). In the Supplemental web appendix (Galbiati
and Zanella, 2012) we do sketch an extended version of the model
that illustrates how the structural interpretation of the multiplier
changes when we allow for preference interactions, but our main
framework—with congestion externalities only—is an important
benchmark. The reason is twofold. First, although our data allows us
to identify precisely the reference groups associated with the conges-
tion externality, it would be impossible (without strong assumptions)
to identify the reference groups associated with other types of social
effects. Since information about reference groups is fundamental a
priori knowledge in empirical studies of social interactions and
since wrong assumptions may lead to inconsistency (Conley and
Topa, 2003), we prefer to consider only the social effects for which
such information is not the outcome of an arbitrary choice. Second,
the results of previous research, when combined with ours, suggest
that local congestion externalities may actually be the fundamental
source of social effects in tax compliance. Fortin et al. (2007) identify
endogenous social interactions associated with tax evasion by using
laboratory experimental data. They ﬁnd no signiﬁcant social effects.
A key feature of their experimental design is that audit probabilities
are constant at each round and are independent of amounts reported
(by oneself and others) across rounds. This feature is important be-
cause it ensures fully random and exogenous audit probabilities. Atthe same time, however, this feature completely shuts off the en-
forcement congestion channel—that is, the only channel present in
our setting. Therefore, the negative ﬁnding of Fortin, Lacroix, and Vil-
leval is not at odds with our ﬁnding of a large effect; in fact, it helps us
to interpret our results. If we assume their experiment is externally
valid, then their results and ours taken together—no signiﬁcant en-
dogenous social effects in a setting with all possible social effects ex-
cept congestion externalities, on the one hand; and signiﬁcant
endogenous social effects in a setting with congestion externalities
only, on the other hand—imply that the social multiplier we identify
reﬂects primarily the congestion channel.
The second notable aspect of our model is that, contrary to those
that introduce nonlinearities (e.g., Brock and Durlauf, 2001a), our
model does not produce multiple equilibria. This indicates that multi-
ple equilibria are not needed for generating excess variance. Excess
variancemay derive—as it does here in a model with a unique equilib-
rium—from a large social multiplier that ampliﬁes relatively small dif-
ferences in fundamentals. Such γ-ampliﬁcation of differences in
group characteristics (Xg and ag/ng) is clear in Eq. (9).
Third, the social multiplier in our model is a structural parameter
representing the short-run, impact multiplier effect following an ex-
ogenous shock to Xi that induces taxpayers, on average, to conceal
one extra dollar. The effect persists in equilibrium as long as the re-
sources ag of the local tax authorities remain constant. However, it
is plausible that these resources adjust in response to shocks that af-
fect equilibrium tax evasion. The speed and the degree of this adjust-
ment determine the dynamic impact of the social externality. In other
words, the γ that we identify is the upper bound of the long-run ef-
fect. In practice, the long-run effect may be substantially smaller
than the short-run one.10 There is a second type of long-run adjust-
ment that is relevant to understanding of how long the effect of the
impact multiplier lasts: taxpayers can move in response to variations
in the auditing budget. We believe this second channel is unlikely to
be quantitatively relevant in Italy. Mocetti and Porello (2010) analyze
the internal mobility of Italian workers and ﬁnd an annual mobility
rate of about 2% since the beginning of the 1990s. It is reasonable to
assume that this is also the mobility rate of workers. Mocetti and
Porello estimate that, on average, about 22% of workers who moved
between 2004 and 2007 were self-employed. Because the self-
employed in Italy accounted for 27% of all workers during this period
(according to Eurostat), it follows that self-employed workers in Italy
have a lower propensity to move than other workers.11 A rough esti-
mate of their mobility rate is (.22/.27)×0.02=1.6%. Even if only the
individuals with large gains from tax evasion moved strategically
across jurisdictions, this mobility rate is so low that it could hardly
be a source of concern even in the long run.
A fourth important aspect of our model is the crucial assumption
that auditing resources are given, at least in the short-run. This im-
plies that in the short-run the central government can neither in-
crease aggregate resources nor reallocate existing resources across
jurisdictions. Several papers have shown that this is true for police re-
sources. For example, Corman and Mocan (2000, 2005) show that
adapting police forces to increased criminal activity in New York
City takes more than six months. Buonanno and Mastrobuoni
(2011) document that, because of a lengthy bureaucratic process, hir-
ing and deploying new police ofﬁcers in Italy may take up to three
years. It turns out that in Italy this is true also for auditing resources:
not only does hiring new tax ofﬁcers take a long time, but even relo-
cating existing ofﬁcers or making them work harder may be difﬁcult.
Table 1
Summary statistics: jurisdictions and audits.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Region Jurisdictions Small (%) Audits Self-employed Intensity, %
Aosta Valley 2 50.0 267 6852 3.9
Piedmont 38 73.7 6887 237,068 2.9
Lombardy 60 73.3 12,634 520,765 2.4
Friuli-V.G. 10 70.0 1407 65,208 2.2
Trentino-Südtirol 12 100.0 1067 50,697 2.1
Veneto 31 80.6 4840 259,584 1.9
Liguria 10 30.0 3661 95,602 3.8
Emilia-Romagna 24 58.3 6016 248,353 2.4
Tuscany 34 79.4 5468 215,758 2.5
Marche 14 71.4 2122 88,906 2.4
Umbria 10 80.0 1257 43,581 2.9
Lazio 14 35.7 5729 273,343 2.1
Abruzzo 13 61.5 2413 66,495 3.6
Molise 4 75.0 569 15,194 3.7
Campania 27 51.8 6720 228,824 2.9
Basilicata 11 90.1 1056 27,335 3.9
Apulia 16 31.3 4968 195,460 2.5
Calabria 31 90.3 2848 84,175 3.4
Sicily 40 70.0 7434 217,394 3.4
Sardinia 11 81.8 1500 73,717 2.0
Italy 412 70.1 78,863 3,014,311 2.6
Notes: Column (1), number of local tax jurisdictions in a given region; column (2)
fraction of local tax jurisdictions classiﬁed as small (i.e., whose number of self-
employed workers is below the average of all jurisdictions; column (3) number of
tax audits of self-employed workers; column (4) number of self-employed workers;
column (5) audit intensity—that is ratio of column (3) to column (4).We describe such frictions in more detail in Section 3, where we illus-
trate the institutional background of our data set.
Finally, our model posits a speciﬁc social spillover: by observing or
expecting more tax evasion at the local level, a taxpayer infers that
the probability of detection will be lower until resources adjust. Our
model is consistent with alternative mechanisms that have been
studied empirically in the literature. For instance, in an investigation
of compliance behavior regarding TV license fees in Austria, Rincke
and Traxler (2011) identify signiﬁcant information spillovers from
law enforcement. The authors employ compliance microdata that dis-
tinguishes between households that were or were not subject to
auditing of fee payments. Using snowfall as an instrument for local in-
spections, they ﬁnd that households respond positively to increased
enforcement in their vicinity. In a static setting like the one we em-
ploy here, the rise in compliance among those who had no exposure
to ﬁeld inspections can be interpreted as the effect of a perceived in-
crease in local enforcement resources arising from the observation of
greater numbers of audits among neighbors. This is what happens in
our model when there is an increase in local resources, ag.12 Similarly,
in a laboratory experiment of Alm et al. (2009) analyzes the effect of
information concerning enforcement and the compliance behavior of
other taxpayers on individual tax-reporting behavior. The authors
ﬁnd that when tax payers are not informed ex ante about the audit
probability, information provided by other taxpayers about their au-
dits affects individual compliance. In particular, an increasing number
of audits is associated with more compliance. Because the “tax au-
thority” in this lab experiment has no budget constraints the in-
creased compliance can be interpreted as the effect of increased
auditing activity on an individual's subjective probability of an
audit. Such responsiveness to a higher perceived probability of
being audited is also consistent with the ﬁndings of Slemrod et al.
(2001).
3. Data set
We gained access to the entire collection of tax audits of self-
employed individuals in Italy (small individual businesses, including
farmers, and professionals) at the end of the 1980s. These are about
80,000 cases.13 The tax audits we observe were performed at the
end of the 1980s on the personal income tax ﬁles (i.e., on self-
reported income from all sources) for tax year 1987 by the Italian
Guardia di Finanza, and the results of the audits are now ﬁnal after
all possible appeals. The Guardia di Finanza is a “tax police” dependent
on the Ministry of the Economy and Finance, and it is in charge of tax
enforcement on behalf of the government. In this paper we exploit a
crucial feature of the Italian tax audit system: its organization is based
on territorial jurisdiction. The Ministry of the Economy and Finance
has local branches that are responsible for tax management and au-
dits within well-deﬁned geographic areas. We label these branches
“local tax authorities” and the associated areas “tax jurisdictions”. At
the time our data were collected there were 412 such jurisdictions
in Italy. Each jurisdiction comprises one or more municipalities or
portions of a large city, and its boundaries are exogenously deﬁned
by law following administrative criteria. A local tax authority has no
competence beyond its own boundaries. These characteristics imply
that tax jurisdictions are the exact reference groups with respect to
the endogenous social effect generated by congestion externalities.12 An alternative, dynamic interpretation of the Rincke and Traxler ﬁnding within our
framework is that past audits increase future compliance of those who were audited,
which increases the future audit probability for those who were not. Kleven et al.
(2011) ﬁnd that past audits do, in fact, increase compliance in a large ﬁeld experiment
in Denmark.
13 The issue of the representativeness of this data set is brieﬂy addressed at the end of
this section and more in detail in the Supplemental web appendix (Galbiati and
Zanella, 2012).Local tax authorities, like the vast majority of administrative enti-
ties in Italy, rely on resources allocated by the central government.
Our assumption that tax authorities can rely on a given amount of re-
sources in the short run seems realistic in light of what is known
about this allocation process. First, hiring new tax auditors implies a
long bureaucratic process; even at the local level, hiring a public em-
ployee in Italy requires a formal, national-level contest, and it can
take years from the day a local tax authority needs additional
human resources in the ﬁeld to the day such resources are actually
deployed. As mentioned in Section 2.2, Buonanno and Mastrobuoni
(2011) document that, for police ofﬁcers in Italy, this delay may be
as long as three years. Second, the transfer of existing tax auditors
from one jurisdiction to another is also a daunting task. In Italy, a pub-
lic employee must agree to being transferred, and usually no ﬁnancial
incentive is allowed to facilitate that agreement. A conﬁdential inter-
view with an ofﬁcer at the national tax agency conﬁrms these facts. In
particular, the interview reveals that tax auditors are one of the most
unionized segments in the Italian public sector (which is itself highly
unionized) and that transferring human resources across local tax ju-
risdictions is subject to bargaining with unions. This picture is in line
with our assumption that resource allocation is a sticky process. In
addition to geographic information and the sector of economic activ-
ity, for each individual we observe income reported for the purposes
of personal income tax as well as the amount found by the audit. We
take the latter to be an accurate estimate of actual income, and we de-
ﬁne concealed income as the difference between actual and reported
taxable income.14
Tables 1 and 2 contain summary statistics disaggregated at the
regional level. Table 1 reports information on local jurisdictions and
audits. The ﬁrst column reports the number of jurisdictions; the14 About 10% of taxpayers in our data over report taxable income. Most over reports are
of negligible amount, sowe treat them asmistakes—consistentlywith ourmodel—and re-
place negative values of concealed income with zeros. Such replacement, however, is
uninﬂuential: a robustness check (not reported but available from the authors upon re-
quest) shows that our estimates are robust to including all or part of the observed over re-
ports as negative numbers (i.e., negative concealed income).
Table 2
Summary statistics: taxable income and tax evasion.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Region Taxable
income
Reported
income
Concealed
income (%)
Tax gap
(%)
Average tax
rate (%)
Aosta Valley 40,735 25,741 36.8 41.9 22.6
Piedmont 41,902 26,145 37.6 44.3 23.1
Lombardy 50,377 34,007 32.5 39.2 24.1
Friuli-V.G. 56,287 24,607 56.3 68.5 24.6
Trentino-Südtirol 40,639 22,367 45.0 53.0 24.1
Veneto 54,053 26,834 50.4 62.3 23.6
Liguria 37,002 20,133 45.6 50.1 23.0
Emilia-Romagna 40,255 25,160 37.5 45.6 23.2
Tuscany 41,287 24,492 40.7 48.7 23.0
Marche 31,884 17,054 46.5 52.5 21.8
Umbria 32,629 21,036 35.5 39.9 21.8
Lazio 54,277 25,985 52.1 61.5 23.1
Abruzzo 28,539 15,799 44.6 51.2 21.1
Molise 40,227 13,244 67.1 75.5 22.7
Campania 32,414 14,423 55.5 64.7 21.7
Basilicata 28,796 12,324 57.2 63.8 21.4
Apulia 44,611 14,083 68.4 78.9 22.4
Calabria 32,406 10,973 66.1 77.8 20.1
Sicily 35,066 15,988 54.4 63.4 21.4
Sardinia 35,858 15,729 56.1 64.2 23.4
Italy 41,990 22,503 46.4 55.2 22.8
Notes: Column (1); taxable income, as attested by the auditor; column (2): taxable
income, as reported by the taxpayer; column (3) estimate of concealed income
(difference between taxable income attested by the auditor and reported by the
taxpayer) as a percentage of taxable income; column (4): tax gap (difference
between tax due and tax paid) as a percentage of tax due; column (5): average tax
rate (ratio of tax due to taxable income). Nominal quantities are expressed in 2010
euros.second reports the fraction of these we classify as “small”. A jurisdic-
tion is classiﬁed as “small” if the number of self-employed individuals
there is less than the average across all jurisdictions and regions. This
distinction between small and large jurisdictions is crucial for our
identiﬁcation strategy, as illustrated in Section 4. The third column
of Table 1 reports the number of audits, and the fourth column re-
ports the number of self-employed individuals in that region; the
last column gives the ratio of these two numbers—that is, the audit in-
tensity. This table shows that about 70% of the 412 local tax jurisdic-
tions in Italy are small. As for audit intensity, 2.6% of self-employed
individuals were audited at the national level, with some variation
across regions: the intensity ranges from 1.9% in Veneto to 3.7% in
Molise. Unfortunately, we do not observe the audit intensity at the ju-
risdiction level.
Table 2 reports sample statistics on income and tax evasion. Nom-
inal quantities are deﬂated using the Italian Consumer Price Index
and are expressed in 2010 euros. The ﬁrst column lists (by region)
the average taxable income resulting from auditors’ attestations,
while the second column lists the corresponding average income
resulting from taxpayers’ declarations. The third column gives the dif-
ference between the two (i.e., our estimate of concealed income) as a
percentage of taxable income, and the fourth column reports an alter-
native measure of tax evasion commonly used in the public ﬁnance
literature—namely, the tax gap. The tax gap is deﬁned as the amount
of tax due that was not actually paid, which we express as a percent-
age of the tax due. Finally, the ﬁfth column reports the average tax
rate, deﬁned as the ratio of tax due to taxable income. It is clear
from Table 2 that there is a positive relation between taxable income
and the average tax rate (the correlation across regions is 0.77),
reﬂecting the progressivity of the tax system in Italy. The table
shows that concealed income amounts to 46% of total taxable income
in our sample, with considerable variability across regions. The tax
gap, instead, is about 55%. These are large numbers, but they are in
line with what is known about tax evasion of self-employed workers
in other countries. For the United States, Slemrod (2007, Table 1)reports a tax gap of 57% for nonfarm proprietor income (the corre-
sponding ﬁgure for farm net income is 72%) and estimates a tax gap
of 52% for the self-employment tax. For Denmark, Kleven et al.
(2011, Table II) report that concealed income is about 42% of taxable
income for individuals who are not subject to third-party report, like
in our sample. This last estimate is based on a large set of randomized
audits, and is surprisingly in accordance with what we see in our data.
At the individual level, the distribution of concealed income in our
sample exhibits wide dispersion even after conditioning on regions (a
reasonably homogeneous unit) or tax jurisdictions. A simple ANOVA
decomposition reveals that the variance explained by region mem-
bership and jurisdiction membership is a mere 0.5% of total variance.
One possible problem with our data set is that it consists of a col-
lection of tax audits, but taxpayers are not (or should not be) audited
at random: one expects tax cheaters to be oversampled. In other
words, we face a potential selection problem. We claim that this is
not an issue: our sample is not much different from a random sample
of the underlying population. In the Supplemental web appendix
(Galbiati and Zanella, 2012) we substantiate this claim by providing
three consistent (and persuasive, we believe) pieces of evidence.
Our interpretation is that this fact reﬂects the inherent difﬁculty of
detecting tax cheaters in Italy back in the 1980s. At that time the
tax authority had to rely on what we now know was inadequate in-
formation technology. In other words, even though auditing activities
were designed to select individuals who were ex ante more likely to
evade taxes, the outcome differed little ex post from a random
sample.
4. Identiﬁcation
4.1. An illustrative example
Because the identiﬁcation method we use is relatively new, we
begin by presenting a simple example to illustrate how identiﬁcation
works and to present in a nutshell the key ideas exploited more for-
mally later in this section. We remark that positive complementar-
ities among decision makers within a given reference group have
two important consequences. First, they generate excess variance of
individual behavior with respect to individual and group fundamen-
tals. Second, they drive a wedge between the between-group and
the within-group variance of individual behavior. These two facts
offer a lever for identiﬁcation. To see this, consider an individual
with preferences given by
v eig; eg
 
¼ bieig−
1
2
e2ig þ Jeigeg ; ð10Þ
where eig denotes a continuous individual behavior (for individual i in
group g), ēg average group behavior, and J the strength of the comple-
mentarity between the two. Think of bi as the individual-speciﬁc, ran-
dom marginal private beneﬁt of behavior, and think of the quadratic
term as the convex cost of such behavior. For simplicity, consider
the case in which all groups contain exactly n individuals. Here the
unique Nash equilibrium has the linear-in-means form
eig ¼ bi þ Jeg ; ð11Þ
eg ¼ γbg ; ð12Þ
where γ≡1/(1− J) is the social multiplier and bg is the average of bi in
the group. It is straightforward to verify the two aforementioned
properties. First, the excess variance property is easy to see from the
ANOVA decomposition of the total variation in individual behavior:
V eig
 
¼ V E eig gj Þ
 
þ E V eig gj Þ
 
;

ð13Þ
whereE andV denote the expectation and variance operators, respec-
tively. If we substitute Eqs. (11) and (12) into each other and into
Eq. (13), the result is
V eig
 
¼ γ2V bg
 
þ E V bi gj Þð Þ:ð ð14Þ
The two terms on the RHS have the usual interpretation of, respec-
tively, between-group (explained by group membership) and within-
group (unexplained by group membership) variations of individual
behavior. There is excess variance because, by (14),
V eig
 
γ>1 > V eig
 
γ¼1:
 ð15Þ
In short, the cross-group variance of mean behavior is larger in the
presence of complementarities (γ>1) than in the case of indepen-
dent decision making (γ=1). The difference between the two
terms in Eq. (15) is not explained by fundamentals (i.e., bi).
Now we verify the second property by writing the within- and
between-group variances of behavior explicitly, from Eqs. (11) and
(12), as
V eig jg
 
¼ V bi gj Þ;ð ð16Þ
V eg
 
¼ γ2V bg
 
¼ γ2 1
n
V bijgð Þ þ γ2
n−1
n
C bi; bj
 
; ð17Þ
where C denotes the covariance operator. Here the last equality fol-
lows from the deﬁnition bg≡n−1∑i∈gbi, and i and j are generic indi-
viduals.15 Therefore, substituting Eq. (16) into Eq. (17), we can
write the between-group variance as
V eg
 
¼ γ2 1
n
V eig jg
 
þ γ2 n−1
n
C bi; bj
 
:
That is, in the presence of complementarities (γ>1) the between-
group variance is ampliﬁed with respect to the within-group vari-
ance. In this linear model, the wedge is equal to γ2. For the ideal
case in which individuals are randomly assigned to groups (which
implies C bi; bj
  ¼ 0 and also constant within-group variance), γ2 is
identiﬁed by nV eg
 
=V eig
 gÞ. If there is sorting into groups (which
implies C bi; bj
 
≠0 and also varying within-group variance) then
we need at least one variable z that affects the between-group vari-
ance only through the within-group one. That is, z is excluded from
the covariance term,
V eg jz
 
¼ γ2 1
n
V eigjg; z
 
þ γ2 n−1
n
C bi; bj
 
;
in which case γ2 can be identiﬁed using z as an instrumental variable.
This is the key idea in Graham (2008). The identiﬁcation method that
we will employ below is a generalized version of this simple example.
4.2. From linear-in-means to linear-in-variance
The inferential problem is to estimate parameter J in Eq. (6), and
the implied social multiplier, γ. Identiﬁcation is a concern for a num-
ber of reasons, which are now well understood in the social interac-
tions literature (see Blume et al., 2011). First, observe that Eqs. (6)
and (8) form a system of simultaneous equations. Identiﬁcation of
the ﬁrst equation, and so of the endogenous social effect of interest,
requires an exclusion restriction in the form of a variable that affects
average but not individual concealed income. This is the essence of
the “reﬂection problem” (Manski, 1993)—that is, the problem of15 The Supplemental web appendix (Galbiati and Zanella, 2012) provides details
about this derivation.separating the effect of mutual inﬂuences (endogenous effect γ)
from the effect of common inﬂuences (contextual and correlated ef-
fects δ1, δ2, and δ3) in the reduced form (9). As illustrated by Brock
and Durlauf (2001b), the reﬂection problem could be solved by ﬁnd-
ing an individual effect (i.e., a variable in Xi) whose average is not a
contextual effect (i.e., a variable in Xg). Since the contextual controls
Xg are the averages of the individual controls Xi, no such restriction is
available. This reﬂects the open-ended nature of social interactions
models, and ours is no exception. Second, even if such an instrument
were available, a number of unobservable individual- and group-level
effects (including the determinants of self-selection into reference
groups) would be confounding factors. The method developed by
Graham (2008) considerably mitigates these fundamental identiﬁca-
tion problems in linear models of social interactions. In this class of
models, as the previous example shows, comparing the conditional
variance of individual behavior within groups and the corresponding
conditional variance between groups allows one to isolate the portion
of cross-group variation that is due to endogenous social effects only.
This requires that at least one of the conditioning variables does not
affect certain components of the covariance matrix of individual be-
havior, a restriction admitting a convenient economic interpretation.
We now illustrate this method in detail for the problem at hand.
Consider two vectors W1g and W2g that contain observable
jurisdiction-level information, and rewrite the equilibrium Eq. (9) in
variance-components form while assuming that, besides W1g and
W2g, we observe only concealed income and group membership.
That is, deﬁne αg≡δ2 Xg þ δ3ag=ng as group-level heterogeneity,
εi≡δ1Xi as individual-level heterogeneity, and εg≡δ1 Xg as the group-
level average of the latter. Then Eqs. (9) and (8) become
eig ¼ γαg þ εi þ γ−1ð Þεg ; ð18Þ
eg ¼ γ αg þ εg
 
: ð19Þ
Eq. (18) slightly differs from Graham's behavioral equation, where
group-level heterogeneity αg is not ampliﬁed by the social multiplier
γ. Without ampliﬁcation, there is no way that that shocks to contex-
tual variables can trigger a feedback chain between group and indi-
vidual behavior—a chain that is captured by our framework. The
reason is that Eq. (18) is derived from an economic model in which
altering institutional variables leads to changes in behavior that are
subsequently propagated via social externalities. If one posits a be-
havioral equation whereby interactions occur directly via average in-
dividual characteristics (rather than indirectly in the reduced form, as
in our model), then contextual variables that are not reﬂected in av-
erage individual characteristics cannot generate multiplier effects.
Graham (2008, 646, fn. 7) recognizes that, in his framework, “γ may
be a composite function of multiple ‘structural’ parameters. In Manski
(1993) it depends on the strength of what he terms ‘exogenous’ and ‘en-
dogenous’ social effects.”. Thanks to explicit modeling of the mecha-
nism that generates externalities, the social multiplier we identify
has a sharper interpretation: it is a known function of structural pa-
rameters and reﬂects endogenous social effects only.
Denote by σε2(W1g, W2g) the variance (conditional on W1g and
W2g) of individual heterogeneity, by σεε(W1g,W2g) the corresponding
conditional covariance across individuals, by σα2(W1g,W2g) the condi-
tional variance of group-level heterogeneity, and by σαε(W1g,W2g) its
conditional covariance with individual heterogeneity. Note that σεε(⋅)
measures the degree of sorting of taxpayers across jurisdictions: it
should be zero if they were randomly located with respect to individ-
ual characteristics. Similarly, σα2(⋅) captures the variance in unob-
served characteristics of the tax authority (e.g., the efﬁciency of tax
auditors, the resources they can rely on) as well as other institutional,
cultural, and market characteristics common to all taxpayers in a
given jurisdiction. Finally, σαε(⋅) reﬂects the extent of matching
16 This is a standard, testable rank condition:
E Gwg W1g ¼ 1;W2g
 i≠E Gwg W1g ¼ 0;W2g
 i;hh
here W1g is a dummy variable indicating whether the jurisdiction is small or large.between such characteristics and taxpayers. This covariance is nonze-
ro when, for instance, resources are allocated to tax authorities on the
basis of taxpayer characteristics or taxpayers locate themselves across
jurisdictions on the basis of how (in)efﬁcient local tax authorities are.
Suppose σεε(⋅), σα2(⋅), and σαε(⋅) are all independent of W1g. Fol-
lowing Graham (2008) closely, we show in the Supplemental web ap-
pendix (Galbiati and Zanella, 2012) that, after conditioning on W1g
and W2g, the within-group variance of concealed income in jurisdic-
tion g (denoted Vgw) and the corresponding between-group variance
(denoted Vgb ) can be written as follows:
Vwg ¼ E
σ2ε W1g ;W2g
 
−σεε W2g
 
Ng
W1g;W2g
2
4
3
5; ð20Þ
Vbg ¼ γ2 σ2α W2g
 
þ 2σαε W2g
 
þ σεε W2g
 
þ Vwg
 
: ð21Þ
Two points are worth noting. First, the within-group variance (20)
is independent of social interactions and group-level heterogeneity.
This is intuitive: for example, if there are differences in individual
tax evasion in a given jurisdiction in which tax ofﬁcials are corrupt
or there are social externalities, then such variability cannot be as-
cribed to corruption or social effects (which are the same for every-
one, in our model) but only to differences between individuals and
to covariance between individual characteristics generated by the
process of sorting. Second, the between-group variance (21) depends
on group heterogeneity and is ampliﬁed by social effects when these
are present (i.e., when γ>1). This is also intuitive: for example, part
of the variability in tax evasion between two groups—one whose tax
ofﬁcials are corrupt and the other not—must depend on corruption.
Yet because the level of tax evasion in a group depends on social in-
teractions, which alter contextual differences, so must the cross-
group variation. In other words, the presence of social interactions
drives a wedge between the variance of illegal behavior at different
levels of aggregation. In a linear-in-means model this wedge is pro-
portional to γ2, which can be exploited to identify γ.
We assume that the portion of the between-group variance (21)
that is independent of the within-group variance can be written as a
linear function of W2g; thus,
γ2 σ2α W2g
 
þ 2σαε W2g
 
þ σεε W2g
  
¼ θW2g : ð22Þ
Next, we rewrite conditional variances as conditional expectations
of the appropriate within- and between-group statistics Ggw and Ggb ,
respectively (see the Appendix):
Vwg ≡E G
w
g W1g ;W2g
 ; ð23Þ
Vbg≡E G
b
g W1g ;W2g
 ; ð24Þ
then, after using (22), Eq. (21) becomes
E Gbg W1g ;W2g
  ¼ θW2g þ γ2E Gwg W1g ;W2g
 : ð25Þ
Eq. (25) generates a conditional moment restriction,
E Gbg−θW2g−γ
2Gwg W1g ;W2g
 i ¼ 0;h ð26Þ
which in turn implies the following unconditional moment restriction:
E W1gW2g
 
Gbg−θW2g−γ
2Gwg
 	 

¼ 0: ð27ÞThis equation provides the basis for estimating γ2 by GMM, with
W1g as an instrument. Assuming this is a valid instrument means
restricting the covariance matrix of cross-group tax evasion. There-
fore, as illustrated by Durlauf and Tanaka (2008), such a covariance
restriction parallels the exclusion restriction needed to solve the re-
ﬂection problem and thus identify social interactions in a regression
framework based on model (6). This identiﬁcation strategy has the
important advantage of being robust to arbitrary individual and
group-level unobservables.4.3. The identifying assumption
A “natural” identifying restriction, as in Graham (2008), is provid-
ed by group size. The key observation is that the dispersion of individ-
ual heterogeneity is greater in small jurisdictions than in large ones.
The reason is that individuals with above-average propensity to
cheat on taxes are more easily offset in large than in small groups
by individuals with below-average propensity to cheat, and vice
versa.16 The maintained identifying assumption is that sorting (σεε),
the allocation of auditing resources (σα2), and matching (σαε) are
not affected by the size of the jurisdiction. This means ruling out, for
instance, that (i) the best auditors are systematically allocated to
large (or small) jurisdictions, and (ii) dishonest taxpayers move to
small (or large) jurisdictions to avoid such high-quality auditors. No-
tice, ﬁrst, that in our data set there is no relation between the size of a
jurisdiction and the urban or rural classiﬁcation of the area where it is
located; in particular, large cities contain both small and large juris-
dictions. Second, we test a necessary condition that a valid instru-
ment must satisfy: whether the size of the jurisdiction predicts the
amount of tax revenue (relative to taxable income) recovered by
the local auditor. That amount is a reasonable measure of the audi-
tor's quality and of auditing resources in general. If auditors and re-
sources are allocated based on jurisdiction size, then we should
observe a signiﬁcant correlation between that size and the recovered
tax revenue. To check whether this is the case, we regress the
jurisdiction-level tax gap on the small dummy (see Section 3). The re-
sults from this regression are reported in Table 3.
The coefﬁcient on small is negligible: auditors in large jurisdictions
recover only a statistically insigniﬁcant 0.1 additional percentage
points of the tax gap relative to their colleagues in large jurisdictions
(on a basis of 55 percentage points). This supports our assumption
that the quantity and quality of auditing resources are not related to
the size of the jurisdiction. It follows from this lack of correlation
that taxpayers’ sorting is also unrelated to the size of the jurisdiction:
not only is size unrelated to the urban/rural characteristics of the area
but it does not predict the quality of the auditors either. Finally, if nei-
ther allocation of resources (σα2) nor sorting (σεε) is related to the size
of the jurisdiction then matching (σαε) is probably also unrelated to
small. Of course we do not claim that these arguments validate the in-
strument, but they do weaken the main argument against its validity.
Under our identifying assumption, whether the jurisdiction is
small or large (i.e., W1g) affects the between-group variance of con-
cealed income only through the within-group variance; this is illus-
trated by Eqs. (20) and (21). Feasibility requires an estimate of the
conditional mean of concealed income, E eig W1g ;W2g
  . We use the
predicted value from the regression of eig on a constant, on W1g and
on W2g. The logic of the model suggests W2g should include informa-
tion that may affect sorting, matching, and the allocation of auditing
resources. A regression of concealed income on the information avail-
able in our data set (group size, sector of economic activity, and
Table 3
Relation between jurisdiction size and auditor's quality.
tax gap
small −0.001
(0.018)
Constant 0.555
(0.015)
Observations 412
Note: The dependent variable, tax gap, is the
jurisdiction-level difference between total tax due (as
found by the audit), and total tax paid, divided by
the former; small is a dummy set equal to 1 if the
size of the jurisdiction is below the national average.
Robust standard errors are given in parentheses.
Table 4
Results.
(1) (2) (3)
Gg
b Gg
b Gg
b
Gg
w (coefﬁcient: γ2) 9.54 10.46 9.52
(4.70) (5.00) (4.66)
special 35.45 — 46.16
(12.42) — (20.01)
sicily — 20.89 −25.14
— (12.71) (22.18)
p-value (H0 : γ2=1) 0.07 0.06 0.07
Model parameters (delta method)
γ 3.09 3.23 3.09
(0.76) (0.77) (0.76)
J 0.68 0.69 0.68
(0.08) (0.07) (0.08)
First stage
small 4.36 4.13 4.36
(2.11) (1.93) (2.12)
special −2.09 — −2.12
(1.65) — (1.84)
sicily — −1.90 0.06
— (1.42) (0.76)
F-stat. (excluded instrument) 4.25 4.58 4.23
Observations 412 412 412
Notes: The dependent variable, Ggb, is deﬁned in equation (is deﬁned in equation (13) in
the Supplemental web appendix) in the Appendix and is such that its conditional mean
is the between-jurisdiction variance of concealed income; γ2 is the square of the social
multiplier; special is a dummy for whether the jurisdiction belongs to a region that
enjoys special autonomy; sicily is a dummy for whether the jurisdiction is located in
Sicily; small is a dummy for whether the size of the jurisdiction is below the national
average. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. The ﬁrst-stage F-statistic
for the excluded instrument (small) is robust to heteroskedasticity.region) shows that such information is not useful in predicting tax
evasion. As a consequence, these variables are not good candidates
for inclusion in W2g. We include instead a dummy for whether a re-
gion enjoys special autonomy (Regione a statuto speciale ). There are
ﬁve such autonomous regions in Italy: Sardinia, Sicily, Trentino-
Südtirol, Aosta Valley, and Friuli-Venezia Giulia. These regions have
a certain degree of ﬁnancial autonomy: they retain most of the per-
sonal income tax revenue generated locally, and they can impose
taxes of their own. Sicily is an extreme example of such ﬁnancial au-
tonomy: this region not only retains all of the local personal income
tax but also collects it directly. In particular, all autonomous regions
participate to the tax auditing activities of the central government.17
Therefore, autonomous region status (dummy variable special) is a
good candidate for inclusion in W2g. Another good candidate is a
dummy for jurisdictions located in Sicily (dummy variable sicily),
given the extreme case this region represents.5. Results
Our results are reported in Table 4. Since the model is exactly
identiﬁed, we simply estimated it by two-stage least squares. The γ2
that we estimate ranges between 9.52 and 10.46 across the three
speciﬁcations. The null hypothesis that this is equal to 1 (i.e., J=0)
is always rejected at the 10% conﬁdence level. Because this method
identiﬁes the square of the social multiplier, it leaves the sign of J
undetermined. We assume (consistently with our model) that J>0.
Under this assumption, our estimates imply a value for γ ranging
between 3.1 and 3.2 and a value for J ranging between 0.68 and
0.69 . We recovered the standard errors of these parameters using
the delta method. Our estimates point to a strong amplifying role of
the within-jurisdiction enforcement congestion: an exogenous
shock altering concealed income independently across individuals
produces an equilibrium variation that is up to 3 times the initial re-
sponse. First-stage results indicate, as expected, that in small jurisdic-
tions the variance of tax evasion is signiﬁcantly larger than in large
jurisdictions; this ﬁnding reﬂects the greater dispersion of individual
heterogeneity in small groups.
Although these results cannot be easily compared with other ﬁnd-
ings in the literature on social interactions, it is worth noting that so-
cial multipliers of similar magnitudes have been found in different
contexts. Most relevant for our work is that Glaeser et al. (1996)
ﬁnd a social multiplier for crime of 2.8 in the United States. With re-
gard to criminal activity in Italy, Drago and Galbiati (in press) ﬁnd a
social multiplier greater than 2 for the recidivism of former Italian
inmates.17 We are grateful to Chiara Martini for pointing out this privilege of autonomous re-
gions in Italy.6. Conclusion
In this paper we suggested that both the enforcement mechanism
and the allocation of resources are important causes of social interde-
pendencies in tax evasion. In particular, endogenous social effects can
be generated in a simple model of law enforcement from congestion
in auditing resources. Even though social externalities are a plausible
explanation for the high variation in tax compliance, empirical re-
search on tax evasion has largely ignored this possible determinant
of individual behavior. This state of affairs is due mainly to the ex-
treme difﬁculty of identifying social effects. We have employed a rel-
atively new identiﬁcation method (Graham, 2008) that exploits the
information contained in conditional variances at different levels of
aggregation. This method is particularly useful when working with
scant administrative data sets. Using data from Italy and assuming
that the size of local tax jurisdictions affects the cross-group variance
of tax evasion only through the within-group variance we have iden-
tiﬁed a tax evasion social multiplier of about 3. We regard this empir-
ical exercise as a contribution to both the tax evasion and the social
interactions literatures.
Our work offers important suggestions for tax enforcement policy.
An obvious suggestion is that a government can reduce tax evasion at
a cost that is much less that the cost of directly inducing each taxpay-
er to abide by tax regulations. Symmetrically, loosening tax enforce-
ment would reduce tax revenues more when externalities are
present. This remark points to another important implication of our
ﬁndings: tax evasion can be reduced signiﬁcantly by ﬁrst removing
social externalities among potential tax cheaters. In practice, it is im-
portant that ﬁscal authorities internalize congestion externalities to
prevent the perceived probability of punishment from decreasing
when more tax evasion is observed at the local level. In particular,
our analysis suggests that a more ﬂexible resource allocation mecha-
nism would be an effective tool for controlling tax evasion. The
enforcement congestion externality arises because the allocation of
resources is a sticky process in the short run. In an ideal system,
where resources can be instantaneously allocated, that externality
would not be present. This picture is consistent with suggestions
from previous studies (e.g., Bordignon and Zanardi, 1997) emphasiz-
ing that although the total amount of resources devoted to tax admin-
istration in Italy is in line with other countries, the local allocation and
use of such resources is inefﬁcient for two reasons: (i) in each region
there is a roughly constant, highly persistent number of ofﬁcers per
capita and hardly any mobility across regions; and (ii) a large number
of ofﬁcers are employed in residual administrative tasks while only a
small number of them are employed in auditing and enforcement ac-
tivities. A more ﬂexible allocation process of existing resources would
lead to reduced levels of tax evasion at a relatively small cost.
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